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Controlling excess capacity in common-pool
resource industries: the transition from input to
output controls*
Dale Squires, Yongil Jeon, R. Quentin Grafton and
James Kirkley†

Overcapacity is a major problem in common-pool resources. Regulators increasingly turn from limited entry to individual transferable use rights to address overcapacity. Using individual vessel data from before and after the introduction of
individual harvest rights into a ﬁshery, the paper investigates how characteristics of
rights, scale of operations and transition period aﬀect changes in individual and
ﬂeet capacity utilisation and excess capacity. The results indicate that individual
harvest rights in both theory and practice oﬀer the potential to address the problem
of overcapacity in common-pool resources currently managed with limited-entry
regulations.
Key words: common-pool resources, limited entry, overcapacity, property rights.

1. Introduction
Overcapacity is a well-known problem with the exploitation of common-pool
resources. For example, ﬁrms may wish to invest in inputs to ensure that they
can secure a minimum viable level of production from the scarce resource.1
Such investments are individually rational provided that the beneﬁts of
the investment outweigh the associated costs, but for the industry as a whole
they are wasteful because they simply redistribute the scarce output or
* Grafton is grateful for the ﬁnancial support provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the assistance of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
in supplying the data used in the analysis. The results are not necessarily those of the U.S.
National Marine Fisheries Service. The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions
from Rob Felthoven and two anonymous referees.
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1
The emphasis in some common-pool resources, such as ﬁsheries, is frequently on overcapitalisation. Overcapitalisation, however, entails only excessive amounts of the capital stock and
overlooks other potential stock resources such as labour (which is sometimes variable and
sometimes ﬁxed) and variable inputs. Hence, the emphasis on overcapitalisation overlooks the
entire bundle of inputs that are excessively allocated to the sector.
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yield between ﬁrms without increasing overall output or revenues. Overcapacity also raises the potential – and sometimes the actual – exploitation
rate of the resource stock, which itself may well be overexploited.2 By raising
their debt load, overcapacity makes ﬁrms more vulnerable to changes in the
resource base, regulations, environmental conditions and prices. Excess
capacity may also make it diﬃcult for the regulator to reduce the total yield
in response to declines in the resource stock without imposing bankruptcies
and job losses, or lead to negative spillovers in other industries and resources.
To overcome overcapacity, regulators increasingly use output controls,
and especially transferable property rights, rather than input controls. Transferable harvest rights for individual ﬁshing vessels are commonly called individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and give ﬁrms a ﬁxed share of the total
allowable catch (TAC).3 If harvesting rights are well-deﬁned and transferable,
there are no transaction costs and with suﬃcient time, ﬁrms can either exit or
trade to a desired level of capacity utilisation. Thus, ITQs can potentially
prevent further increases in overcapacity in ﬁsheries that would occur in
limited-entry ﬁsheries with input controls and oﬀer the possibility of
increased capacity utilisation for those ﬁrms that remain ﬁshing and purchase
ITQs to achieve a desirable scale of production.
Despite the growing use of ITQs in ﬁsheries and the worldwide problem of
overcapacity in ﬁsheries, only Dupont et al. (2002) tested for changes in
capacity immediately following the introduction of transferable harvesting
rights. Only a limited number of studies have tested for the changes in capacity using data from before, at the time of introduction, and some years after
the implementation of ITQs.4 Such analysis is required to assess whether the
beneﬁts of ITQs to reduce excess capacity and raise capacity utilisation have,
in fact, been realised. Thus, our paper helps shed light on the following questions: how rapidly does adjustment in capacity utilisation occur with the
introduction of individual harvesting rights? Do diﬀerences in the characteristics of the property rights (especially transferability) have an impact on the
capacity changes? To what extent does the existing level of capacity of ﬁrms
inﬂuence changes in capacity and CU over time? Using individual ﬁrm data
2

This is particularly true of ﬁsheries not regulated with a TAC but instead are controlled by
a limited opening. For example, in escapement ﬁsheries like salmon ﬁsheries, ﬁshers are permitted to ﬁsh only at very restricted periods so as to allow suﬃcient ﬁsh to escape up river to
spawn. The greater the ﬁshing capacity, the more diﬃcult it is for the regulator to estimate the
timing of the ‘opening’ to ﬁsh, and the greater the likelihood that more ﬁsh will be harvested
that is desired from a biological perspective.
3
Like our paper, Asche et al. (2009), by distinguishing between nontransferable and transferable quotas, discuss the importance of transferability for capacity adjustment. They analyse
a ﬁshery with individual but not transferable quotas, indicating that the corrected incentives
using individual quotas do not improve their situation, as the main challenge is the capacity,
which is only reduced with transferability. Also, Homans and Wilen (2005) discuss the important feature of changes in ﬁshing practices that increase revenue rather than improve capacity
utilisation although this is not directly relevant in using a primal approach like our paper.
4
The recent literature on estimating the change in the CU in ﬁsheries includes Felthoven
(2002), Weninger (2008), Lian et al. (2008) and Weninger (1998).
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from the British Columbia halibut ﬁshery from before and after the introduction of ITQs, the paper addresses each of these questions by providing individual and ﬂeet capacity and CU measures and testing for changes in these
measures over time and across vessel size (Homans and Wilen 1997).
Section 2 reviews the notions of capacity and CU, in renewable commonpool resource industries with stock-ﬂow production technologies. Section 3
describes the BC halibut ﬁshery that was in the transition phase. Section 4
tests for changes in capacity and CU from before and after the introduction
of ITQs. Section 5 discusses the empirical results at the level of the individual
ﬁrm and for the industry, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Capacity and capacity utilisation and common-pool resources
Traditional measures of capacity and CU are primal measures and are based
on the notion of sustainable maximum possible output given the ﬁxed factors,
where variable inputs are fully utilised under normal operating conditions
(Morrison 1985; Corrado and Mattey 1997).5 Johansen (1968) was one of the
ﬁrst to develop a primal measure of capacity, which was later extended by
Färe et al. (1989). Primal measures of capacity correspond to the full-input
point on a production function, provided that it is sustainable (Klein and
Long 1973).6 CU is usually deﬁned as the ratio of actual output to some measure of potential output (Morrison 1985; Nelson 1989). Thus, a CU value less
than unity implies that ﬁrms have the potential for greater production without having to incur major expenditures for new capital or equipment (Klein
and Summers 1966).
In common-pool resource industries, ﬁrms face at least two factors or
stocks that aﬀect their capacity – the resource stock and the stock of capital.
Measures of capacity and capacity utilisation then face the unique issue of
accounting for the resource stock because the greater the stock, and hence
5

Morrison (1993) and Corrado and Mattey (1997) discuss the deﬁnition of full employment
or full utilisation level of variable inputs. They note that it depends upon the type of technology and institutional factors that constitute issues such as ‘normal’ downtime. Short-run output varies with technology type in diﬀerent ways according to (i) duration and (ii) intensity or
speed of operations. Duration, rather than intensity, is generally more important in ﬁshing
industries, because the biological conditions (e.g. species type) tend to dictate speed of operations such as tow speed or encircling rates or ‘soak’ time in the water for passive line or net
gear. Intensity plays a larger role in deﬁning full utilisation of the variable inputs, to the extent
that on-board processing constrains intensity.
6
Klein and Long (1973, p. 744) state that, ‘Full capacity should be deﬁned as an attainable
level of output that can be reached under normal input conditions – without lengthening
accepted working weeks, and allowing for usual vacations and for normal maintenance.’ Garofalo and Malhotra (1997) observe that the U.S. Bureau of the Census survey uses the concept
of practical capacity, deﬁned as ‘the maximum level of production that this establishment
could reasonably expect to obtain using a realistic employee work schedule with the machinery
and equipment in place’ and assuming a normal product mix and downtime for maintenance,
repair and cleanup. Both Klein and Long and Garofalo and Malhotra discuss the dependence
of full capacity upon ‘normal operating conditions’. Normal operating conditions, in turn, are
implicitly dependent upon the structure of property rights and the associated institutions.
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surplus yield or ﬂow of overall output, the higher the CU of ﬁrms for a given
stock of capital or other ﬁxed factors. Capacity measures are thus contingent
on the level of both the resource stock and the ﬁrms’ capital stocks. To
account for this phenomenon, a technological economic measure of capacity
can be deﬁned as the maximum yield in a given period of time that can be
produced given the current technology, state of the resource and environmental parameters while keeping ﬁxed factors at their current level and with the
unrestricted use of the variable inputs under normal operating conditions.7
An important issue when measuring capacity in common-pool resource
industries is that the resource stock must either not decline over time or
always remain above a minimum viable level. This sustainability requires that
the industry’s overall output ﬂow not exceed a sustainable target yield, such
as maximum sustainable yield, and maintain the resource stock at a corresponding sustainable target level.8 Thus, from the perspective of the technological economic primal approach, industry excess capacity exists whenever
industry capacity output exceeds the target sustainable level of industry output, the latter as deﬁned by a sustainable TAC (FAO 1998, 2000; Kirkley and
Squires 1999). By contrast, in other industries that do not exploit a commonpool resource stock, excess capacity is deﬁned as the level of capacity output
for an individual ﬁrm in excess of current output.
3. Capacity and the British Columbia halibut ﬁshery
The BC halibut ﬁshery, prior to the introduction of ITQs, limited entry with
input controls. Strict limits were placed on the minimum ﬁsh size that can be
harvested for biological reasons, and a total harvesting limit ensured a sustainable exploitable biomass. Over time, increasing restrictions were placed
on eligibility to ﬁsh for halibut in Canadian waters. Because of protests and
appeals by BC ﬁshers, licences were allocated even to ﬁshers without signiﬁcant association in the ﬁshery. Thus, a total of 435 halibut vessel licences were
allocated in 1979, despite only about active 300 vessels.
The restriction on vessel entry failed to prevent increased ﬁshing eﬀort of
those vessels already in the ﬁshery. Vessel length and gear restrictions were
7
Speciﬁcation of the resource stock as a technological constraint rather than as a natural
capital stock under the control of an individual ﬁrm circumvents the indeterminancy problem
of capacity and CU with multiple capital stocks under the control of ﬁrms. That is, provided
there is a single capital stock, speciﬁcation of the resource stock as a technological constraint
does not specify a second capital stock under the control of the ﬁrm. This indeterminancy
problem is compounded when there are multiple outputs along with multiple capital stocks
(Berndt and Fuss 1989).
8
The target level of output (resource ﬂow) can be a moving target if the target level of output is periodically adjusted, such as when the resource stock is not presently at a long-term
optimal level. If the management authority intends to let the resource stock grow, i.e. the
resource is in a rebuilding phase, then the sustainable target should be suﬃciently small enough
to allow growth of the resource stock to exceed depletions from exploitation. The exploitation
rate could exceed the target yield if the resource stock is in a drawing down phase starting from
high levels of resource abundance.
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Table 1 Season length, number of active ﬁshing vessels and total catch in the BC halibut
ﬁshery
Year

Season length (days)

Number of active vessels

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

65
58
61
24
22
22
15
16
14
11
6
214
240
245
245
245
245

333
337
301
305
334
363
417
424
435
435
435
433
431
351
313
294
281

Total catch (pounds)
5
5
5
5
8
9
10
12
12
10
8
7
7
10
9
9
9

650
654
524
416
276
587
240
251
859
738
569
189
630
560
900
499
499

447
856
783
757
152
902
471
086
562
715
367
273
198
141
958
717
717

Source: Grafton et al. (2000).

subsequently imposed to address the problem, and the season length was
systematically reduced over the 1980s due to capture of the TAC in a
progressively smaller period of time. Contributing to the problem was the
gradual ‘take-up’ and use of the unused, but allocated, halibut ﬁshing licences
such that from 1980 to 1990, the number of active vessels increased by 30 per
cent, while the number of ﬁshing days declined by over 90 per cent (Table 1
and Turner and Weninger 2005).
The increase in the number of vessels was also associated with an increase
in the number of crew per vessel and duration of ﬁshing per vessel per day.
The use of the ﬁshing season as an input control exacerbated the overcapacity
problem because it provided an additional incentive, over and above the
rivalry associated with catching a scarce TAC, for ﬁrms to invest in inputs
and catch their desired share of the TAC before the season ended. For
example, if ﬁshers have a standardised and ﬁxed catch rate of q per level of
ﬁshing eﬀort unit per day, with a ﬁxed TAC and identical ﬁshers, then the
smallest aggregate ﬂeet ﬁshing eﬀort needed to catch the total harvest in a
limited season of length S is
K ¼

TAC
qS

ð1Þ

Thus, for a ﬁxed TAC and q, a decrease in the season length increases the
minimum total ﬂeet ﬁshing eﬀort and reduces the CU.9 The end result of a
9
This result is adapted from Clark (1990, p. 263), who shows the same outcome in terms of
the smallest ﬂeet capable of catching the TAC over the entire season.
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decline in the ﬁshing season in the ﬁshery was that by 1990, it was just 6 days
long for each vessel and, by various measures (vessel numbers, variable inputs
employed), ﬁshing inputs had substantially increased since the introduction
of limited-entry regulations 11 years earlier.
The failure of limited-entry and input controls to prevent further ‘eﬀort
creep’ led a group of ﬁshers to request that the regulator introduce a system
of ITQs. The ﬁshers initiating this request believed that a switch to individual
output controls would make the season length restriction redundant and
allow more proﬁtable ﬁshers to expand their operations by purchasing harvesting rights from the less proﬁtable. Following extensive deliberations and
a vote in 1990 in which the majority of ﬁshers voted in favour of introducing
ITQs, the new management system was introduced in 1991. ITQs were allocated gratis to vessel owners on a formula based on the best catch in the previous 4 years and the vessel size. This allocation tended to favour more
marginal ﬁshers, who may have had only one good harvest, and also ﬁshers
with larger vessels.
For the 1991 and 1992 seasons, the individual harvest rights were not transferable except when the halibut ﬁshing license and vessel were sold together.
Starting in 1993, the harvest rights were made transferable among halibut
license holders, although restrictions remained on both the divisibility of the
rights and the total amount of rights that any one vessel can have (Casey
et al. 1995; Grafton et al. 2000). Continuing limits on the divisibility of quota
have tended to favour larger vessels that have the scale of operations to buy
quota in larger quantities, and quota trading has tended to increase the average size of vessels.
Introduction of ITQs in 1991 also rendered the season length restriction
redundant as a method to control total ﬂeet harvest. Thus, the season length
increased dramatically from just 6 days in 1990 to 214 days in 1991 and subsequently to 245 days. However, restrictions remain on the gear that can be
used to catch halibut and vessel length restrictions attached to the halibut
license and other species licenses in BC.
4. Testing for changes in capacity and capacity utilisation
Individual vessel data from the BC halibut ﬁshery oﬀer a unique opportunity
to measure capacity output and CU before and after the introduction of individual harvesting rights. Data are available from 44 vessels in 1988 when the
ﬁshery was under limited-entry regulations, from 44 vessels in 1991 when
individual harvesting rights were ﬁrst introduced, and from 19 vessels in
1994, 3 years after the introduction of individual output controls and a year
after the harvesting rights were made transferable and more divisible. Unfortunately, the data are not from a panel of vessels but are from randomly
selected cross sections of vessels in all three periods. The mean and standard
deviation of the revenue, harvests and costs of the sample ﬁshers, in all three
periods, are provided in Table 2.
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Table 2 Summary statistics of the data
Variable

Vessel length (metres)
Crew weeks
Fuel quantity (litres)
Halibut revenue
Price of halibut
Halibut landings (pounds)
Crew
Weeks ﬁshed
Landings/crew
Landings/week
Fuel cost
Labour cost
No. observations

1988, 1991, 1994

1988

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

St. Dev

14.10
12.91
6995.15
88 747.81
2.78
34 026.63
3.78
3.36
8143.52
11 731.65
2420.62
2081.87
107

5.45
9.68
9505.11
70 140.23
0.72
28 966.98
1.48
1.92
4561.69
9798.18
3634.45
740.22

14.48
15.68
8303.38
107 329.48
2.03
51 769.55
4.52
3.39
10 735.89
17 541.05
3257.05
2346.55
44

3.54
11.33
13 201.26
74 208.75
0.15
33 978.76
1.55
1.97
4863.64
11 388.93
5137.61
767.18

1991
Vessel length (metres)
Crew weeks
Fuel quantity (litres)
Revenue
Price
Halibut landings (pounds)
Crew
Weeks ﬁshed
Landings/crew
Landings/week
Fuel cost
Labour cost
No. observations

13.44
8.57
4153.69
51 378.07
3.08
16 475.10
3.02
2.91
5224.56
7199.40
1122.86
1745.87
44

1994
7.34
5.39
2767.51
34 241.58
0.21
10 690.77
1.09
1.79
1972.49
5809.97
710.79
590.17

14.73
16.53
10 545.78
132 257.05
3.85
33 583.47
3.79
4.37
8682.33
8653.84
3488.95
2247.05
19

3.77
9.85
7758.94
82 213.02
0.30
19 681.81
1.28
1.74
4283.86
6131.51
2548.30
715.96

Notes: All values are in 1994 Canadian dollars and are per vessel. Crew size includes captain. Weeks ﬁshed
pertain to weeks actively ﬁshing halibut. Halibut landings are in pounds, and the price is per pound. Fuel
quantity is in litres and vessel length in metres.
Source: Grafton et al. (2000).

The data for the 107 observations were used to solve the output-oriented
data envelopment analysis (DEA) of Färe et al. (1989), which is speciﬁed in
Appendix I. The DEA model speciﬁes output as the round weight of halibut
landed (pounds) per vessel per day ﬁshed and the vessel’s capital stock and
ﬁxed input is measured by its gross registered tonnage. Capacity output in the
stock-ﬂow production technology of a natural resource industry is conditional upon the natural resource stock. Thus, halibut biomass (tons) is also
included as a ﬁxed variable and is divided by the number of days ﬁshed for
each vessel to be consistent with the speciﬁcation of output on a daily basis.
The excess capacity measures are conditional on the duration of the ﬁshing
season and number of vessels, given the resource stock size and availability.
Any meaningful comparison over time therefore requires a standardised
metric, which is provided by the capacity output measure per vessel per day
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of operation.10 A daily measure of vessel capacity output allows for the full
utilisation of the variable inputs and accounts for the diﬀerences in season
length before and after the introduction of ITQs. Daily measures may be
extrapolated to an annual basis for each vessel by multiplying the capacity
output per vessel per day of operation by the number of days in the halibut
season. Measuring capacity output on a daily production basis thus solves
the problem of a varying annual production period because of the regulations
in ﬁshing industries. Duration of the ﬁshing season also helps to establish the
prevailing normal operating conditions, such that multiplying this measure
by the number of vessels in the ﬂeet gives annual industry capacity.11
A second-stage analysis evaluated the vessel-and-per-day eﬀects of ITQs
on the ﬂeet by regressing capacity output and CU per vessel per day upon
dummy variables for year and vessel size classes.12 The explanatory variables
in these regressions were annual dummy variables for 1988 (D88), 1991(D91)
and 1994 (D94), which were multiplied by dummy variables for two size classes of vessel length: small, or less than 1400 cm (DS) and large, equal to or
greater than 1400 cm (DL). Tobit regressions accounted for the censoring of
the CU measures at zero and one when CU was the dependent variable (CU
ranges between 0 and 1 inclusive). Ordinary least squares were used when
capacity output was the dependent variable.
Using the second-stage regression results, the eﬀects of transferable property rights were evaluated by tests of the null hypothesis of no changes in
capacity or CU between the three time periods (1988–1991, 1991–1994 and
1988–1994) and for a given vessel size class (large and small). Thus, H0: D88
DS)D91 DS = 0 tests the null hypothesis of equal capacity or CU for small
vessels between 1988 and 1991. F-tests were used with the ordinary least
squares regressions, but Wald tests were used with the Tobit regressions.
5. Transferable property rights and capacity
Summary measures of the mean halibut capacity output per vessel per
operating day over the 3 years 1988, 1991 and 1994, and all years combined are reported in Table 3. Mean capacity per vessel per operating day
10

The data preclude us from quantitatively accounting for intensity, because we do not
have, for example, the number of hours ﬁshed per day or the number of lines with their ‘soak’
time.
11
This approach allows capacity to be calculated corresponding to normal operating conditions. Specifying the number of days or vessels and multiplying the capacity per day by the
number of days gives the normal operating conditions. Capacity per day could also be multiplied by each vessel group’s maximum observed days at sea when calculating the annual capacity measures. Projections for the future are found by multiplying capacity per day by the
expected days at sea and number of vessels.
12
This approach allows us to account properly for the data set as a pooled time series of
cross sections rather than as a panel data set, because we evaluate cohorts – vessel size classes –
rather than individual vessels over time (Deaton 1995). Speciﬁcally, the regression coeﬃcients
for each cohort in each time period are sample means for that cohort-time period.
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Summary statistics of capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day
Capacity

All years 1988–1994
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations
Year 1988
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations
Year 1991
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations
Year 1994
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations

CU

All

Small

Large

All

Small

Large

Vessels

Vessels

Vessels

Vessels

Vessels

Vessels

92 147
97 883
162 100
7881
32 421
107

84 239
93 549
125 296
7881
30 780
71

107
112
162
47
30

744
309
100
353
193
36

0.38
0.33
1.00
0.06
0.27
107

0.32
0.21
1.00
0.06
0.27
71

0.51
0.51
1.00
0.07
0.25
36

111
114
162
19
27

103
108
125
19
24

581
411
296
874
983
25

121
124
162
47
27

706
651
100
353
481
19

0.47
0.47
1.00
0.06
0.26
44

0.40
0.41
1.00
0.06
0.26
25

0.55
0.58
1.00
0.07
0.24
19

79 534
87 093
120 608
7881
29 894
34

102
99
136
66
27

278
245
984
076
526
10

0.23
0.17
1.00
0.06
0.18
44

0.20
0.16
1.00
0.06
0.18
34

0.31
0.35
0.47
0.12
0.12
10

77
82
90
54
13

654
664
654
637
856
7

0.55
0.51
1.00
0.07
0.32
19

0.47
0.37
1.00
0.07
0.34
12

0.68
0.70
0.95
0.27
0.23
7

408
167
100
874
331
44

84 703
87 093
136 984
7881
30 616
44
64
69
90
31
18

782
371
654
082
263
19

57
58
79
31
16

273
147
101
082
556
12

Note: Small vessels £1400 cm length. Large vessels >1400 cm length.

over all three periods combined was 92 147 pounds, and the mean CU per
vessel was 0.38. Mean daily capacity output and CU were both higher for
large vessels compared to small vessels over all 3 years combined, and for
each individual year.
The results indicate that all vessels did not fully utilise their daily capacity,
but this eﬀect is emphasised for smaller vessels. For 1991, this diﬀerence was,
in part, accentuated because the initial allocation of harvesting rights tended
to favour larger vessels. Table 3 also indicates that capacity output declined
for both small and large vessels from 1988 to 1991, and again from 1991 to
1994, and over the entire period from 1988 to 1994. By contrast, CU ﬁrst
dipped and then rose for all vessels taken together, and separately for both
small and large vessels.
Second-stage regression analysis can be used to test the null hypotheses
of no change in capacity output and CU per vessel per operating day for
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all vessels, and for small and large vessels separately, over the three periods
1988–1991, 1991–1994 and 1988–1994. The estimates of the coeﬃcients of
the dummy variables are the mean values for the deﬁned subgroups – vessels and years – given in Table 4. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5
per cent level, with the exception of the coeﬃcient D91 for small vessels.
Table 5 reports the detailed hypothesis test results. Table 6 summarises the
results of the hypothesis tests and whether daily vessel capacity catch
Table 4 Second-stage regression results
Dummy variable for

Tobit regression for
capacity utilisation

OLS regression for
capacity output

0.422
41.774

103 581.10
19.81

0.077
1.606

79 534.04
17.74

0.255
2.454

57 272.92
7.59

0.557
21.335

121 706.40
20.29

0.401
27.292

102 278.20
12.37

0.736
7.001

77 654.19
7.86

43.006

)1237.09

1988 small vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
1991 small vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
1994 small vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
1988 large vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
1991 large vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
1994 large vessels
Coeﬀ
t-stat
Log-likelihood

Notes: All variables are dummy variables. The estimates were obtained using the Berndt–Hall–Hall–
Hausman maximisation algorithm.

Table 5 Tests of signiﬁcance for changes in daily vessel capacity output and capacity utilisation over time and by vessel size class
Null hypotheses

1988 Small = 1991 Small
1988 Large = 1991 Large
1991 Small = 1994 Small
1991 Large = 1994 Large
1988 Small = 1994 Small
1988 Large = 1994 Large

Capacity per vessel per day

Capacity utilisation per
vessel per day

Test statistic

Signiﬁcance

Test statistic

Signiﬁcance

12.18
3.62
6.43
3.65
25.43
14.52

0.00
0.06
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.00

36.99
19.66
3.73
9.61
2.33
2.92

0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.13
0.09

Notes: 1. Hypothesis tests for capacity output per vessel per day are F-tests with one degree of freedom.
2. Hypothesis tests for capacity utilisation are Wald tests with one degree of freedom.
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Table 6 Percentage change and signiﬁcance of daily vessel capacity and capacity utilisation
changes over time and by vessel size class
Capacity and
capacity
utilisation

Small vessels
1988–1991

Capacity per
vessel per day

)23.2*

Capacity
utilisation per
vessel per day

)81.8*

1991–1994
)28.0*
+231.2

Large vessels
1988–1994

1988–1991

1991–1994

1988–1994

)44.7*

–16.0*

–24.1

)36.2*

)39.6

)28.0*

+83.5*

+32.1

*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.

and CU increased or decreased and whether the change was statistically
signiﬁcant.
Table 6 indicates that capacity output per vessel per operating day for both
small and large vessels signiﬁcantly declined between 1988 and 1991, falling by
23 per cent for small vessels and 16 per cent for large vessels. The signiﬁcant
decline in daily vessel capacity output for small vessels continued over the period 1991 to 1994, falling by a further 28 per cent. Although daily capacity catch
per vessel also fell for large vessels from 1991 to 1994, the decline was signiﬁcant at the 6 per cent level. Over the entire period 1988 to 1994, daily vessel
capacity catch fell signiﬁcantly for small vessels by 45 per cent and fell by 36
per cent for large vessels. Daily vessel CU for small vessels signiﬁcantly
declined at the 1 per cent level over the period from 1988 to 1991 and at the 6
per cent level for the period from 1991 to 1994 but did not signiﬁcantly change
for the period from 1988 to 1994. Such a decline is attributable, in part, to the
initial allocation of harvesting rights favouring larger vessels and because of
the 44 per cent decline in TAC from 1988 to 1991. For large vessels, daily vessel
CU declined at 1 per cent level of signiﬁcance from 1988 to 1991, increased at 1
per cent from 1991 to 1994, and increased at 10 per cent over 1988–1994.
In sum, over the entire time period, the introduction of individual harvest
rights was associated with a decline in production capacity per vessel per
operating day for both vessel size classes. Moreover, the introduction of individual harvest rights coincided with a signiﬁcant increase in CU per vessel per
operating day for large vessels from 1991 to 1994. In part, the higher CU for
large vessels may be explained by their favourable treatment in the initial allocation of quota in 1991. In addition, a larger scale of operations likely gives
larger vessels greater ﬂexibility to adjust their capacity, especially in terms of
variable inputs like labour.
5.1 Explaining changes in capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day:
1988–1991
Capacity output per vessel per operating day for both small and large vessels
fell because of both reduced crew size (Table 2) and a reduced duration of the
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ﬁshing day or trip. This occurred because the frenzied production rate under
the limited-entry ﬁshery no longer existed with the 15-fold increase in the ﬁshing season from 1988 to 1991. An important factor in the unexpected decline
in CU per vessel per operating day from 1988 to 1991 was the 44 per cent
drop in the TAC – the sustainable target industry output – from 5833 to 3261
metric tons. This almost 50 per cent decline in the total permitted sustainable
output forced both small and large vessels to harvest much less than they
wished.
Another important explanation for the lack of increase in CU between
1988 and 1991 is that individual harvest rights were not transferable in 1991
or 1992. Thus, ﬁrms did not face a market price associated with a marginal
change in harvesting and could neither overcome any harvest constraint by
purchasing quota nor increase their ﬁshing eﬀort to compensate for the
decline in the TAC because the individual output controls were fully enforced
by the regulator. In other words, individual output controls without transferability, combined with a large decline in the TAC and a removal of season
length constraint reduced the CU per operating day of vessels. The net result
was that CU per vessel per day of production declined, despite the fact that
capacity fell over the period.
5.2 Explaining changes in capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day:
1991–1994
Beginning in 1993, individual harvest rights have been transferable among
the 435 ﬁshers with a halibut ﬁshing licence. Transferability has allowed
some vessels to expand their scale of operations by buying quota from exiting
vessels. Thus, trading has enabled some ﬁrms to exit and others to accumulate quota, increasing the scale of their operations and thereby matching
quota holdings to capacity output. Overall quota trading increased the concentration of individual harvest rights with ﬁrms having larger vessels. As a
result, the number of active vessels in the industry fell from close to its
maximum level of 433 in 1991 to 313 in 1994, a decline of about 28 per cent.
Vessel numbers continued to decline as vessels consolidated their holdings of
harvesting rights, and by 1996 there were only 282 vessels operating in the
ﬁshery.
Transferability of the harvest rights also permitted excess capacity to exit
the ﬁshery and allowed ﬁrms that have remained in the industry to increase
their capacity utilisation. Thus, for both small and large vessels, mean capacity catch per vessel per operating day fell and CU per vessel per operating day
increased over the 1991–1994 period. However, the only statistically signiﬁcant changes were the declines in capacity output per vessel per operating day
for small vessels and the increases in CU per vessel per operating day for large
vessels.
An almost 50 per cent increase in the TAC from 1991 to 1994 combined
with a decline in the number of active vessels has contributed to a doubling of
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the mean landings of sample ﬁshers over the period. Thus, a higher output
per vessel because of both a larger TAC and quota accumulation, coupled
with a declining or stable capacity output per vessel per operating day, contributed to the 83 per cent increase in the mean CU per vessel per operating
day for large vessels over the period 1991–1994 (Table 4). These combined
changes contributed to the 37 per cent decline in industry capacity and excess
capacity over the same period.
Overall, the results support the theoretical predictions that the introduction
of individual and transferable harvesting rights into a limited-entry and
input-controlled ﬁshery should result in an overall decline in excess capacity.
The results also emphasise the importance of transferability of the harvesting
rights in helping to reduce excess capacity.
6. Concluding remarks
Common-pool resources under open access have long suﬀered from
excess capacity because output is rivalrous, such that investments in
increased capacity at a ﬁrm level may be proﬁtable, but at the industry
level, they fail to increase the total yield that is ﬁxed by nature. In fact,
such increases in industry capacity often tend to place additional harvest
pressures on the resource stock. The traditional method of controlling
this problem has been to restrict the number of harvesters and control
their inputs. Limited-entry regulations have often been unsuccessful at
preventing ongoing increases in excess capacity because ﬁrms are frequently able to substitute from regulated to unregulated inputs (Dupont
1991; Squires 1994). Consequently, in some common-pool industries with
ill-structured property rights, such as ﬁsheries, substantial excess capacity
exists.
To help address the excess capacity and rent dissipation problem in openaccess ﬁsheries, regulators are increasingly using individual output controls in
the form of individual and transferable harvest rights. Using data from the
BC halibut ﬁshery before and after the introduction of individual harvest
rights, measures of capacity output, excess capacity and capacity utilisation
are calculated. The results indicate that the introduction of individual and
transferable harvest rights has coincided with substantial and statistically signiﬁcant reductions in capacity output. The results also indicate that median
capacity utilisation is higher for large versus small vessels both before and
after the introduction of harvesting rights.
Capacity in the ﬁshery declined, in part, because the switch to individual
harvesting rights allowed a change in season length from 6 days to 214 days,
and subsequently to 245 days. The much longer ﬁshing season reduced the
previously hectic pace of ﬁshing and allowed ﬁrms to substitute some variable
inputs with increased time at sea. Another important contributing factor to
the reduced excess capacity has been the transferability of individual harvest
rights that has created an opportunity cost from harvesting, allowed ﬁrms to
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exit the ﬁshery and remove their capacity, and permitted remaining ﬁrms to
expand their output to achieve a better scale of production. Overall, the
empirical results conﬁrm our theoretical insight that individual and transferable harvest rights, given suﬃcient time, and relative to limited-entry
regulations, are able to reduce excess capacity and increase ﬁrm capacity
utilisation.
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Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Kokkelenberg, E. (1989). Measuring plant capacity, utilization
and technical change: a nonparametric approach, International Economic Review, 30,
655–666.
Felthoven, R.G. (2002). Eﬀects of the American Fisheries Act on capacity, utilization and
technical eﬃciency, Marine Resource Economics, 17(3), 181–205.
Garofalo, G.A. and Malhotra, D. (1997). Regional measures of capacity utilization in the
1980s, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXXIX, 415–421.
Grafton, R.Q., Squires, D. and Fox, K.J. (2000). Private rights and economic eﬃciency: study
of a common-pool resource, Journal of Law and Economics, 43, 679–713.
Homans, F.R. and Wilen, J.E. (1997). A model of regulated open access resource use, Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, 1–21.
Homans, F.R. and Wilen, J.E. (2005). Markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access
ﬁsheries, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49, 381–404.
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Appendix I
Measuring capacity using data envelopment analysis
The nonparametric DEA approach proposed by Färe (1984) and Färe
et al. (1989) estimates capacity output given the capacity base, resource
stock and environmental conditions. Capacity output corresponds to the
output that could be produced, given full and eﬃcient utilisation of variable inputs under normal operating conditions, and given the constraints
imposed by the ﬁxed factors, the state of technology and resource stock.
Firms do not produce at full capacity if they are technically ineﬃcient or
employ insuﬃcient levels of variable inputs given the constraints. Diﬀerent
levels of the resource stock would yield diﬀerent levels of capacity in the
stock-ﬂow production technology of a common-pool resource industry,
such as a ﬁshery.
Following Färe et al. (1989), we deﬁne j = 1, …, J observations or ﬁrms in
an industry producing M outputs, l 2 RM
þ , by using a vector of inputs
N
M
N
xj 2 Rþ , where Rþ and Rþ are sets of all non-negative real numbers, and N is
partitioned into ﬁxed, Fx, and variable inputs, Vx. ljm denotes the mth output
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produced by the jth ﬁrm and xjn denotes the utilisation of the nth input by the
jth ﬁrm. Inputs and outputs satisfy the following assumptions:
(i) ujm  0; xjn  0
J
P
ujm >0; m ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M
(ii)
(iii)

j¼1
N
P

xjn >0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J

n¼1

(iv)

J
P

xjn >0; n ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N

j¼1

(v)

M
P

ujm >0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J

m¼1

Condition (i) imposes the assumption that each producer uses non-negative
amounts of each input to produce non-negative amounts of each output.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) require total or aggregate production of positive
amounts of every output and total or aggregate employment of positive
amounts of every input. Conditions (iv) and (v) require that each ﬁrm
employs a positive amount of at least one input to produce a positive
amount of at least one output. Zero levels are permitted for some inputs
and outputs.
Färe et al. (1989) illustrate that capacity at the plant level, following
Johansen (1968), could be estimated by partitioning the ﬁxed (Fx) and
variable inputs (Vx) and solving the following output-oriented, DEA
problem:
max h
h;z;k

ð2Þ

subject to:
hujm 

J
X

zj ujm ; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;

j¼1
J
X

zj xjn  xjn ; n 2 Fx

j¼1
J
X

zj xjn ¼ kjn xjn ; n 2 Vx

j¼1

zj  0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J
kjn  0;
where h is an output-oriented measure of technical eﬃciency (h ‡ 1.0), and zj
is the intensity variable for the jth observation (which serves to construct the
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technology by taking convex combinations of the data).13 Multiplying the
observed output by h gives an estimate of capacity output.14 Capacity can
also be estimated by solving problem (2) without the variable input constraints. Problem (2) imposes a strong disposability in outputs and constant
returns to P
scale.15 Variable returns to scale are introduced by the convexity
constraint zj = 1.

13

The intensity vector Z = (Z1, Z2, …, ZJ) 2 RJþ denotes the intensity levels at which each
of the J ﬁrms or producers operate. The Z vector allows a decrease or increase of observed production activities (input and output levels) to construct unobserved but feasible activities. The
Z vector provides weights that are used to construct the linear segments of the piecewise, linear
technology (i.e. the reference technology constructed by DEA).
14
Technical eﬃciency from an output orientation indicates the maximum potential levels by
which all outputs could be increased with no change in input levels. A technical eﬃciency score
of 1.0 indicates technical eﬃciency. The value of h is restricted to ‡ 1.0. If h > 1.0, production
is ineﬃcient and output levels could be increased by h ) 1.0. h is the inverse of an output distance function and equals the ratio of the maximum potential output to the observed output
level. The expansion in output levels is radial, so that output levels are kept in ﬁxed proportions. Multiplying the observed output by h gives the estimate of capacity output.
15
Estimating capacity without the variable input constraints indicates that the variable
inputs are in fact decision variables, in line with the Johansen deﬁnition that assumes input
ﬁxity combined with unlimited access to the variable input dimensions. In addition, strong disposability of outputs implies that the producer has the ability to dispose of unwanted outputs
with no private costs.
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